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Abstract
Interorganizational interactions are often complex and paradoxical. In this research, we
transcend two management paradoxes: competition versus cooperation and open-source
versus proprietary technology development. We follow theOpenStack open-source ecosys-
tem where competing firms cooperate in the joint-development of a cloud infrastructure
for big data. We provide a narrative, complemented with social network visualizations,
which depicts the evolution of cooperation and competition. Our findings suggest that
development transparency and weak intellectual property rights (i.e., characteristics of
open-source ecosystems) allow a focal firm to transfer information and resources more
easily between multiple alliances.
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Introduction
Organizations do not live in isolation; they are networked in nature. Many firms, particularly in the high-
tech industry, have increasingly engaged in different kinds of cooperative interorganizational relationships
(e.g., contractual alliances, joint ventures, consortia, standards bodies and open-source communities) to
improve their resource endowment and manage strategic uncertainty (Chen and Miller, 2015; Eisenhardt,
1989; Hoffmann, 2007; Morgan et al., 2013). Consequently, organizations are embedded in dynamic and
cohesive networks where individual and organizational actions are influenced by both their network and
their network position (Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Granovetter, 1973; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Uzzi, 1996).
Scholars early recognized interorganizational relationships as an important source of competitive advan-
tage (Dyer and Singh, 1998; Hoffmann, 2007; Zaheer et al., 2000). While interorganizational interactions
have become more complex, they have also become more paradoxical (Lewis, 2000). Paradox pervades
daily life, and how to manage paradox has long been the subject of philosophical and organizational in-
quiry (Chen, 2008). Organizational researchers have previously highlighted the significance of paradox
in business practice, “excellent companies have learned how to manage paradox” (Peters and Waterman,
2004, p.100). Poole and Van de Ven (1989, p.563) urged researchers to seek out forms of paradox and look
for theoretical tensions or oppositions to stimulate the development of more encompassing theories (Smith
and Lewis, 2011).
In this research, we transcend two management paradoxes filled with theoretical tension: competition ver-
sus cooperation and open-source versus proprietary technology development. As a particularly vexing or-
ganizational paradox, competition versus cooperation occupied historically a central position in manage-
ment research (Chen, 2008; Yami et al., 2010). With a stronger emphasis on R&D and innovation, the
paradox of open-source versus proprietary technology development has attracted wide multi-disciplinary
attention (Crowston et al., 2012; Raasch et al., 2013; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003).
On the one hand, much literature addressing competition versus cooperation stresses the concepts of intel-
lectual property, cross-licensing, secrecy and gatekeeping (Bengtsson and Kock, 2014; Gnyawali and Park,
2009; Ritala and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013). On the other hand, open-source versus proprietary tech-
nology development stresses the concepts of freedom, transparency, openness and inclusiveness (Aksulu
and Wade, 2010; Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Gacek and Arief, 2004; Raymond, 1999; von Hippel and von
Krogh, 2003).
In this research, we explore ”open-coopetition”, a neologism recently proposed by Teixeira and Lin (2014)
to describe cooperation among competitors in the open-source arena. There are several known cases of
open-coopetition as captured in Table 1. Cooperation among competitors in an open-source way has become
common in differentR&D intensive sectors – it can be observed in the development ofweb, cloud computing,
mobile, automotive and medical technologies among others.
Project Domain Examples of competing firms cooperating in the project
WebKit Web browsing technologies Apple, Nokia, Google, Samsung, Intel and BlackBerry
Blink Web browsing technologies Google, Opera, Intel and Samsung
OpenStack Cloud computing infrastructure Rackspace, Canonical, IBM, HP, Vmware and Citrix
CloudStack Cloud computing infrastructure Citrix, SunGard AS and ShapeBlue
Xen Virtualization technologies University of Cambridge, Citrix, IBM, HP and Red Hat
Hadoop Distributed computing technologies Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Jive, Microsoft and Hortonworks
Open Handset Alliance Mobile devices platform Google, LG, Samsung, HTC, Huawei, ZTE, Lenovo and NEC
Tizen Mobile devices platform Fujitsu, Huawei, NEC, Casio, Panasonic and Samsung
GENIVI Alliance In-Vehicle Infotainment platform Volvo, BMW, Honda, Hyundai, Renault and PSA
Linux The Linux operating system Fujitsu, HP, IBM, Intel, Samsung, Hitachi and Red Hat
Yocto project Development tools for embedded Linux Broadcom, AMD, Texas Instruments and Intel
Linaro Development tools for embedded Linux ARM, Samsung, ST-Ericsson and Texas Instruments
Eclipse Software development environment Actuate, CA, IBM, Google, Oracle, SAP and Red Hat
OpenEMR Health records and medical practice software OEMR, EnSoftek, MI-Squared, ZH Healthcare and Visolve
Table 1. Known cases of cooperation among competitors in the open-source arena (i.e. open-
coopetition)
Even if cooperation among competitors and open-source software are phenomena with recognized impact
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on how value is created, explored and exploited in networked settings, there are very few studies address-
ing how rival firms simultaneously cooperate and compete in the open-source arena (Germonprez et al.,
2013; Teixeira et al., 2015). From a practitioner’s viewpoint, this is unfortunate since naive assumptions
concerning “work with competitors” and “open-source work” can lead in practice to opportunistic behavior,
unintended spillover effects, and loss of reputation and trust among partners (see Markus and Agres, 2000;
Nooteboom et al., 1997; Park and Russo, 1996; Sharma et al., 2002). Given the scarcity of theory and em-
pirical studies addressing this new phenomenon, we conducted this exploratory case study guided by the
broad and open research question: “‘how competitors cooperate in open-source ecosystems?”.
Theoretical background
Strategic networks and ecosystems
Even if many see firms as distinct and autonomous units of action, it has been both sighted and increas-
ingly recognized that firms are embedded in networks comprised of close, robust and multidimensional
connections that that blur organizational boundaries (Gilsing et al., 2008; Granovetter, 1973; Powell and
Smith-Doerr, 1994; Rowley et al., 2004; Uzzi, 1996). Organizational theory now stresses the need to un-
derstand how the relational context in which firms are embedded influences their behaviors (Gulati, 1998;
Rowley et al., 2004).
Early identified drivers of inter-firm cooperation include: reducing costs through product rationalization
and economies of scale (Contractor and Lorange, 1992; Mariti and Smiley, 1983), sharing total risks and
total costs of large projects (Baldi, 2012; Harrigan, 1984), accessing new knowledge and complementary
assets (Kogut, 1988; Teece, 1992), developing technology and accessing complementary markets (Cravens
et al., 1996), co-creation/co-production of value (Chan et al., 1997; Ramirez, 1999), solving market failures
that emerge under conditions of bounded rationality (Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1991), shaping com-
petition with the aim of increasing or decreasing market competition (Fuller and Porter, 1986; Garud and
Kumaraswamy, 1993), faster access to new markets (Contractor and Lorange, 1988; Hung et al., 2003),
gaining legitimacy and reputation (DiMaggio and Powell, 2000; Greenwood and Meyer, 2008), securing
investment (Guiso et al., 2004; Stam and Elfring, 2008) and reducing uncertainty from resource require-
ments (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Even if most interorganizational research takes the point of view of a
focal firm embedded within one alliance it is known that uncertainty drives firms to establish a portfolio of
alliances – firms are often embedded in multiple strategic networks (Dreyfus et al., 2005; Hoffmann, 2007;
Lavie and Miller, 2008; Lavie and Singh, 2012).
The ecosystem construct, as a way of making the networked interdependencies of the firmmore explicit, has
gained prominence in both research and practice (Adner, 2006; Iansiti and Levien, 2004b; Moore, 1999).
Theory underlying the ecosystem construct have focused on understanding coordination among partners
in exchange networks that are characterized by simultaneous cooperation and competition (Afuah, 2000;
Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 2011). Studies in this arena have explored the challenges that arise when
incentives across the ecosystem are not aligned (Casadesus-Masanell and Yoffie, 2007), the role of estab-
lished relationships with ecosystem partners in shaping firms motivations to compete for different market
segments (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995), the activities that focal firms undertake to induce exchange
partners to favor their specific technology platforms (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002), and the flow of activity
among partner firms (Adner and Kapoor, 2010).
In our view, the ecosystems construct stresses the importance of actor-to-actor networked relationships.
Therefore, our view on strategic networks (Gulati, 1998; Jarillo, 1988; Rusko, 2014; Zaheer et al., 2000)
and ecosystems (Adner, 2006; Iansiti and Levien, 2004b; Moore, 1999) approximates what others called
”networked collaborations” (Normann and Ramirez, 1993); ”lattices” (Gore, 1985), ”webs” (Hastings, 1993),
”constellations” (Normann and Ramirez, 1994), ”holonic organizations” (McHugh et al., 1995), ”interfaces”
(Gilmore and Krantz, 1991), ”organizations networks” (Perrow, 1972), ”inter-organizational domain” (Trist,
1977) and ”infrastructure” (Tilson et al., 2010).
Prior research has considered mainly the independent motivations and opportunities that guide alliance
formation at the dyad-level (Lavie and Singh, 2012). In this study, we explore the evolution of cooperation
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among competitors at multiple levels; we examine relational interactions a the inter-individual, inter-firm
and inter-ecosystem level (i.e., zooming in and out). As pointed out by Ibarra et al. (2005), distinctive issues
concerned with the alignment of individual and collective networking interests should not be separated.
Cooperation among competitors
As pointed out by the literature on business ecosystems, strategic cooperation among competitors (aka
coopetition) in not uncommon (Clarysse et al., 2014; Iansiti and Levien, 2004a). The phenomenon can be
found, for instance in the automotive industry. The city carmodels Toyota Aygo, Peugeot 108 and Citroën C1
share the same body and equipment. In fact, they are made in the same factory, as a result of a joint venture
between Toyota Motor Corporation and PSA Peugeot Citroën. In the pharmaceutical industry, 10 giants
leading the industry founded TransCelerate BioPharma “as a nonprofit, precompetitive drug company, to
develop shared industry clinical-trial solutions”. Also in the airline industry, dyadic alliances and multilat-
eral alliances have blurred the borders between airline companies over the last two decades (Gudmundsson
and Lechner, 2006). Competition between airlines is less a matter of individual firms competing against
individual firms but rather of airline alliances against airline alliances (Gomes-Casseres, 1994). In the com-
puter and mobile-devices industry, it is also known that Apple, Google and Samsung among others, have
cooperated in the development of open-source web-browsing technologies, even while fighting patent-wars
(Teixeira and Lin, 2014).
On one hand, economists have addressed the phenomenon through public and macroeconomic perspec-
tives. For example, Ausubel (1991), Rochet and Tirole (2002), and Schmalensee (2002) have addressed
cooperation among competitors in ATM and card-payment payment systems. Much of this work, follows
the neoclassical theory in economics in assuming that competition generates economic efficiency (Lado et
al., 1997). Antitrust and regulatory policies prohibit many agreements or practices that restrict free trading
and competition between businesses (European Commission, 2001; Federal Trade Commission, 2000).
In parallel, research on alliances within strategic management gives “important insight into the advantages
that can be obtained by cooperation and the prerequisites needed for an alliance to work, but it is primarily
the cooperative dimension of the relationship that is emphasized” (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000). More re-
cently, Gulati et al. (2012) claimed that important streams of research on alliances remain single-mindedly
focused on the cooperation perspective. Summing up, from the individual and firm perspective, competition
is not necessarily socially desirable (Loury, 1979). However, from a public and macroeconomics perspec-
tives, the existence of competition is essential for welfare (Pigou, 2013).
Although competition and cooperation have individually received much consideration, given limited atten-
tion to the fundamental issue of the interplay between the two concepts (Chen, 2008; Chen andMiller, 2015).
Even if strategic management literature noted the importance of understanding open-source software from
its competitive-cooperative angles (see Bengtsson et al., 2010; Chen and Miller, 2015; McGaughey, 2002),
very few empirical cases exploring cooperation among competitors in open-source arena exist. A few no-
table exceptions here are the studies by Germonprez et al. (2013), Linåker et al. (2016), Teixeira and Lin
(2014), and Teixeira et al. (2015).
Open-source software under a network perspective
Much of the innovative programming that powers software applications, operating systems, clouds servers
and the Internet is the result of “open-source” code – that is, code that is freely distributed as opposed to
being kept secret.
Consistently across recent reviews (Aksulu and Wade, 2010; Crowston et al., 2012; Teixeira and Baiyere,
2014), there is a general consensus that “open-source” (also knownas free-software or software libre) emerged
with a set of four freedoms as suggested by Stallman (1985). These freedoms laid down the foundations for
the open-source software as known today: 1) the freedom to run the program, for any purpose; 2) the free-
dom to study how the programworks, and change it so it does your computing as youwish; 3) the freedom to
redistribute copies so you can help your neighbor; And 4), the freedom to distribute copies of your modified
versions to others.
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The free software idea did not immediately becomemainstream, and industry was especially suspicious of it.
In 1998, the ’hacking’ activists Bruce Perens and Eric Raymond agreed that a significant part of the problem
resided in Stallman’s term ’free software’, which might understandably have an ominous ring to the ears of
business people. Accordingly they, along with other prominent hackers, founded the ’open-source” software
movement (Perens, 1999). “Open-source” software incorporates essentially the same licensing practices as
those pioneered by the free software movement. It differs from that movement primarily on philosophical
grounds, preferring to emphasize the practical benefits of such licensing practices over issues regarding
the moral rightness and importance of granting users the freedoms offered by both free and open-source
software (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003).
From an innovation studies perspective, Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) and von Hippel (2005) suggested
that open-source software development shows that users program to solve their own as well as shared tech-
nical problems and freely reveal their innovations without appropriating private returns from selling the
software. Such “free” user-to-user assistance has turned open-source into a remarkable example of user-
innovation (von Hippel, 2009). It was also reported that the open-source trend has been so strong that
previous, rather monolithic, organizations (e.g., SAP, Intel, Apple, Philips, Xerox, and IBM among oth-
ers) decentralized research labs, open up proprietary technology, and increased their absorptive capacity
for outside-in innovation processes within open-source ecosystems (Chesbrough et al., 2006; Enkel et al.,
2009; Gassmann et al., 2010).
The open-source software phenomenon keeps evolving from the earliest purist views focusing on freedom
(Stallman, 1985) to newer perspectives considering open-source as an alternative and viable way of doing
business (Ågerfalk and Fitzgerald, 2008; Feller and Fitzgerald, 2002; Fitzgerald, 2006). Moreover, the
phenomenon has expanded from open-source software to open-data (Gurstein, 2011; Janssen et al., 2012),
open-hardware (Maharaj et al., 2008; Söderberg, 2013), open-knowledge (Awazu and Desouza, 2004),
open-access (Antelman, 2004; Davis et al., 2008; Swan, 2007), and open-medicine (Bradner, 2011; Open
Medicine Institute, 2015), among other manifestations of increasing openness in the way of doing things.
Even if the open-source phenomenon started to attract early scholarly attention in computer science and
software engineering, the phenomenon is more recently capturing the largest interest from business and
management scholars (Raasch et al., 2013). Therefore, as pointed out by Carillo and Bernard (2015) and
von Krogh and Spaeth (2007), information systems as a discipline is well positioned to be at the center of
trans-disciplinary research addressing the phenomenon.
Empirical background
The cloud computing industry
Since our paper is about cooperation and competition, it is important to mention that the cloud computing
business is dominated by a small number of players, including 1) Amazon, a pioneer in cloud computing
services selling the Amazon EC2; 2) Google, selling services around its Compute Engine (Google Compute);
and 3)Microsoft, heavily marketing cloud strategies based on its Azure cloud computing infrastructure (Mi-
crosoft Azure). Amazon, Google, and Microsoft do not provide cloud infrastructure products, merely com-
puting services. In practice and if there were no alternatives, all cloud computation would run in hardware
and software infrastructures controlled by very few players. Such control from the cloud computing ser-
vice provider locks-in its customers (Armbrust et al., 2010; Briscoe and Marinos, 2009; Chow et al., 2009).
Surprisingly, the leading product alternatives to Amazon EC2, Google Compute and Microsoft Azure are
not commercial but rather four open-source projects. They include: 1) OpenStack, our unit of analysis; 2)
CloudStack, backed by Citrix and the Apache Software Foundation; 3) Eucalyptus, a system that is compat-
ible with Amazon EC2 services and backed by many IT consulting firms; and 4) OpenNebula, more present
in the European markets and backed by C12G, a Spanish company.
The three-dimensional Figure 1 provides a competitive overview of the key socio-technical ecosystems lead-
ing the cloud computing industry. As open-source technology can be freely used, studied, modified and dis-
tributed (Stallman, 1985), wemodeled the open-source ecosystems aswireframe spheres; and as proprietary
technology relies on strong intellectual property protections, is less transparent and often developed behind
corporate doors (Goldman and Gabriel, 2005) we modeled proprietary ecosystems as opaque spheres. The
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size of the spheres took into consideration each ecosystem market-share.
Figure 1. Overview of socio-technical ecosystems leading the cloud computing industry
The OpenStack case
OpenStack is an open-source software cloud computing infrastructure capable of handling big data. It is pri-
marily deployed as an “Infrastructure as a Service” (IaaS) solution. It started as a joint project of Rackspace,
an established IT web hosting company, and NASA, the well-known U.S. governmental agency responsible
for the civilian space program, aeronautics and aerospace research. Today, more than 200 firms and many
non-affiliated individuals contributors pitch in to a set of different open-source projects governed by the
OpenStack Foundation1.
Both private companies (e.g., AT&T, AMD, Canonical, Cisco, Dell, EMC, Ericsson, HP, IBM, Intel, and NEC,
among many others) and public entities (e.g., NASA, CERN, Johns Hopkins University, Instituto de Teleco-
municações, Universidade Federal de Campina Grande, and Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan, among others)
work together with independent, non-affiliated developers in a scenario of pooled R&D in an open-source
way (i.e., emphasizing development transparency while giving up intellectual property rights). We decided
to address the OpenStack case due to its perceived novelty, its high inter-networked nature (i.e., an “ecosys-
tem” involving many firms and individual contributors), its heterogeneity (i.e., an ecosystem involving both
startups and high-tech corporate giants), its market-size ($1.7bn, by 20162), its complexity (i.e., involving
different programming languages, different operating systems, different hardware configurations) and its
size (17,020 community members, 100,000 code reviews, and 1,766,546 lines of code3).
Even if OpenStack emphasizes cooperation in the joint-development of a large open-source ecosystem, there
are many firms directly competing with each other within the community. Among others, there is compe-
tition among providers of public cloud services based on OpenStack (e.g., HP, Canonical, and Rackspace),
amongproviders of specializedhardware complementingOpenStack (e.g., HP, IBM, andNebula), and among
providers of complementary commercial software plug-ins complementingOpenStack (e.g., VMware, Citrix,
and Cisco)4.
1From a legal perspective, the OpenStack Foundation is a nonprofit, non-stock “foundation” within the meaning of Section
501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, “Delaware Corporate Law”.
2http://451research.com/report-short?entityId=82593
3http://opensource.com/business/14/6/openstack-numbers
4For a relational map of competition among OpenStack firms (see Teixeira et al., 2015).
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Method
Our case relied on naturally occurring data which emerged per se on the Internet. Such data are not a con-
sequence of researchers’ own actions, but rather are created and maintained by the OpenStack community
in their own pursuits of developing an open-source infrastructure for big data. In order to make sense of
cooperative and competitive behaviors within OpenStack, we have combined qualitative analysis of archival
data (QA), mining software repositories (MSR), and Social Network Analysis (SNA) on publicly-available
and naturally-occurring data from the OpenStack Nova repository to reconstruct and visualize the evolution
of cooperation in a sequence of networks. Table 2 presents the set of multidisciplinarymethodological notes
that guided our mixed methods research design.
Employed approach Established within Methodological notes
Case studya rooted on archival data Multidisciplinary
Eisenhardt (1989)
Yin (2011)
Dubé and Paré (2003)
Mining software repositories Software-Engineering
Kagdi et al. (2007)
Martinez-Romo et al. (2008)
Teixeira et al. (2015)
Social network analysis Multidisciplinary
Freeman (2005)
Wasserman and Faust (1994)
Kane et al. (2014)
Network analysis of digital trace data Information-SystemsSoftware-Engineering
Hahn et al. (2008)
Howison et al. (2012)
Trier (2008)
Network analysis with emphasis on the visualization of cooperative activities
Biomedicine
Bibliometrics
Innovation-Studies
Lundvall (1992)
Cambrosio et al. (2004)
Teixeira et al. (2015)
a We see case study as an umbrella term covering a group of research methods which focus on a particular instance (see Adelman et al.,
1976). Our case study depended on the use of – and ability to integrate in converging fashion (some would say “triangulate”) – information
frommultiple sources of evidence. The evidence included announcements, financial reports, specialized press reports and actual information
systems artifacts. To built around the consistency of complex data, we were forced to encapsulate different qualitative, quantitative and
social network analysis methods (see Ibarra et al., 2005; Yin, 1997). After all, “Using mixed methods within the confines of a single study
can simultaneously broaden and strengthen the study. ... The stronger the ”mix” of methods throughout these procedures the more that
researchers can derive the benefits from using mixed approaches.” (Yin, 2006).
Table 2. Employed multidisciplinary methodological guidelines
We began our research in a qualitative way by screening publicly available data such as company announce-
ments, financial reports and specialized press reports, which allowed us to review an immense amount of
online information pertaining to the competitive cloud computing industry. While taking into consideration
established methodological notes that legitimate the use of archival data when studying a case (Dubé and
Paré, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Flynn et al., 1990; Gibbert et al., 2008; Shanks, 2002; Yin, 2011), we gained
valuable insights from the industrial context surrounding theOpenStack community. After attaining a better
understanding of the industrial cooperative and competitive dynamics, we extracted and analyzed the social
network of the OpenStack Nova project by leveraging SNA (Brandes et al., 2013; Scott, 2012; Wasserman
and Faust, 1994).
As in Teixeira et al. (2015), we took advantage of naturally occurring digital trace data (i.e., the OpenStack
Nova project repository and its changelog) and built cooperative social networks that were explored us-
ing a variety of tools: Gephi (v0.8.2) (Bastian et al., 2009), Visone(v2.7.3) (Brandes and Wagner, 2004),
and the sna (v2.3-2) and statnet (v2014.2.0) statistical modules (Butts, 2010; Handcock et al., 2003) for R
(v3.0.2) (R Core Team, 2014). To better explore cooperation at the ecosystems level, we also modeled coop-
erative relationships in the tri-dimensional (3D) space using Blender (2.72). Bymining digital traces of code
cooperation, and by uncovering the social structure of the OpenStack Nova project, the computerized SNA
also revealed key preliminary understandings of coopetition in the OpenStack ecosystem that were later re-
investigated with complementary qualitative data. The combination of methods was not only fundamental
for the retrieval of social structures, but also for explaining and them.
As in prior multi-disciplinary studies (Cambrosio et al., 2004; Glänzel and Schubert, 2005; Lundvall, 1992;
Porter et al., 2005; Teixeira et al., 2015), our analysis emphasizes the visualization of the cooperation net-
work, which evolves over time, to reveal the dynamics among the OpenStack software developers. We then
attempted to understand the visualized networks with our acquired understanding from the competitive
cloud computing industry in general and OpenStack in particular. The visualization, together with a deeper
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understanding of the phenomenon under investigation, corresponds to the notion of figuration (Elias, 1978;
Elias and Jephcott, 1982; Smith, 2001) as pointed out in several studies (Cambrosio et al., 2004; Gfaller,
1993; Newton, 2001).
Studies that take an SNA approach are long established in organizational research in general (Cross et al.,
2002; Kane et al., 2014; Rowley et al., 2005; Tichy et al., 1979; Tsai, 2002; Uzzi, 1997), and in open-source
research in particular (Crowston and Howison, 2005; Geipel and Schweitzer, 2012; Martinez-Romo et al.,
2008; Zanetti et al., 2013). Even so, few studies have exploited the potential of social network visualizations
for exploratory research, as recommended by Freeman (2005). By capturing the evolution of cooperative
and competitive behaviors at the individual, firm and ecosystem levels, our multi-method approach aims to
contribute to a broader range of methodologies capable of bridging the gap between causal processes at the
macro-structural organization and those operating at the individual level (see Ibarra et al., 2005). We also
argue, that our SNA approach integrating quantitative and qualitative evidence contributes to bridging the
qualitative-quantitative divide in information systems research (see Ågerfalk, 2013; Oinas-Kukkonen et al.,
2010; Venkatesh et al., 2013).
Results
Wepresent our results in a narrative format complementedwith “pictures” of the evolving social structure of
OpenStack. Such narrative, concerned with how actors simultaneously cooperate and compete in the devel-
opment of an open-source socio-technical ecosystems, aggregates theoretical issues that are later addressed
in the discussion section. Such narrative, built on both quantitative and qualitative evidence, contributes
to the understanding of a rather new and unexplored phenomenon and its embedded paradoxes (i.e., open-
coopetition).
We start by quoting the words of Jim Curry in one of the first announcements of the OpenStack project.
The founding leader of the OpenStack community starts by advocating the freedom of open-source software
before stating the mission of the the OpenStack project. It is important to notice that Jim Curry emphasizes
the roles of NASA and Rackspace as initial contributors to the project – that is, the project did not start from
“ground zero”.
“What is OpenStack? Well, our mission statement says this: To produce the ubiquitous Open
Source Cloud Computing platform that will meet the needs of public and private clouds re-
gardless of size, by being simple to implement and massively scalable. That is a big ambition.
The good news is that OpenStack is starting with code contributions from two organizations that
know how to build and run massively scalable clouds – Rackspace and NASA. — Jim Curry,
OpenStack Lead, 19 July 20105
Visualizations in Figures 2 to 9 provide an understanding of how key players in the cloud computing industry
cooperate in an open-source ecosystem. The size of a node is dependent on its degree-centrality – in other
words, the larger the node, themore social connections the developer has. The value of degree-centrality de-
pends on the number of adjacent nodes with which a node is connected. Therefore, the higher a developer’s
degree-centrality, the more likely he/she is to be cooperating with others.
Figure 2 captures the cooperation in the OpenStack Nova project from the Austin to the Bexar release, from
October 21st 2010 to February 3rd 2011. From it, we can derive the cooperation between software developers
affiliated with companies; for example, Citrix had three developers working on the project together with
Rackspace.
“OpenStack provides a solid foundation for promoting the emergence of cloud standards and
interoperability.” .... “As a longtime technology partner with Rackspace, Citrix will cooperate
closely with the community to provide full support for the XenServer platform and our other
cloud-enabling products.” — Peter Levine, SVP and GM, Citrix, 19 July 2010 6
5http://www.openstack.org/blog/2010/07/introducing-openstack/
6http://www.rackspace.com/blog/newsarticles/rackspace-open-sources-cloud-platform
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citrix
rackspace
developer
& affiliation
collaboration
Figure 2. From the Austin to the Bexar release
Citrix who had worked before with Rackspace, wanted to make sure that their XenServer platforms would
be conveniently integrated with Rackspace’s plans for OpenStack.
“The project is exhibiting the key benefits that the industry derives from successful open-source
cooperation: rapid development, faster testing, feedback and project turn around, broader in-
dustry adoption and learning through implementation andde-facto standardizationwhilst avoid-
ing the prospect of commoditization.
It has been rewarding to work with the OpenStack crew, and to have experienced first hand the
dedication to an open, code-rules, community-first approach taken by the project leaders.” —
Simon Crosby, CTO, Citrix 21 October 2010 7
citrix
cloudscale
rackspace
developer
& affiliation
collaboration
Figure 3. From the Bexar to Cactus release
7http://blogs.citrix.com/2010/10/21/if-youve-seen-one-redwood-youve-seen-them-all/
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Our second visualization with degree-centrality, in Figure 3, captures the cooperation from the Bexar to the
Cactus release (from February 3rd 2011 to April 15th 2011). From this visualization we can observe a new
node, a developer affiliated with Cloudscaling. Cloudscaling was founded in 2006 by the cloud architect
and open-source software advocate Randy Bias and co-founder Adam Waters. It started as a professional
services company selling custom cloud infrastructure for large service providers. They had ’Korea Telecom’
as an early customer, for which the company in 2010 designed and deployed the first OpenStack-based
storage cloud outside Rackspace.
“Earlier this week, one of our clients, a Tier 1 ISP, launched an object storage cloud based on
OpenStack, an open-source compute and storage framework created by Rackspace and NASA.
The new storage cloud is the first commercial OpenStack-based storage offering in the market
after Rackspace itself, which is based on the same technology.” – Joe Arnold, Director of engi-
neering, Cloudscaling, 31 of January 20118
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Figure 4. From the Cactus to the Diablo release
Our visualization in Figure 4 captures cooperation from the Cactus to the Diablo release (from April 15th
2011 to September 22nd 2011). HP (a well-known IT multinational company), Mirantis (an OpenStack
startup), and Red Hat (the company behind the Red Hat Enterprise Linux and sponsor of the Fedora Linux
distributions) joined the coopetitive software development efforts.
Mirantis was founded in January of 2011 by Boris Renski Jr. and Alex Freedland. Also born in Northern
California, this startup marketed itself as a “pure-play” OpenStack company and started working early with
Red Hat. Besides cooperating in the development of OpenStack, both firms partnered in implementation
and integration services at common customers9
In the meantime, HP started marketing their cloud computing services based on OpenStack. HP markets
itself as the leading corporation behind the project, emphasizing that OpenStack is the only cloud computing
solution without a single-vendor lock-in but with an extensive ecosystem behind it10.
Figure 5 depicts the cooperation from the Diablo to the Essex release (from September 22nd 2011 to April
5th 2012). Although the graph becomes more dense, we can visualize new nodes representing early contri-
butions of Intel (investing on the compatibility of OpenStack with Intel microprocessors) and IBM. The later
had a long history of working with open standards and open-source initiatives, such as in the Apache and
8http://cloudscaling.com/blog/cloud-computing/openstack-object-storage-moves-beyond-rackspace/
9http://www.redhat.com/en/about/press-releases/red-hat-and-mirantis-partner-across-products-and-services
10http://www8.hp.com/h20621/video-gallery/us/en/events/enterprise/hp-discover-2011/2793799141001/
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Figure 5. From the Diablo to the Essex release
Eclipse projects, and has been able to sell complementary solutions (i.e., hardware, software, and services)
from open-source projects. It expected the same business model to work well with OpenStack11.
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Figure 6. From the Essex to the Folsom release
Figure 6 shows the cooperation between the Essex and the Folsom release (fromApril 5th 2012 to September
27th 2012). We canobserve that the network becomesmore dense, as there aremore developersworkingwith
each other. Even though some of their developers continued contributing to the project, Citrix had by then
abandoned its OpenStack distribution in order to focus instead on the competing CloudStack cloud comput-
ing open-source ecosystem. Citrix decided to contribute to the competing CloudStack software ecosystem
under the umbrella of the Apache Software Foundation, with a codebase resulting from the acquisition of
Cloud.com of July 2011. This turn of strategy from Citrix was related with OpenStack’s lack of integration
with the Amazon’s APIs (Application Programming Interfaces). Amazon is currently the leader of cloud ser-
vices, and the migration costs to another cloud computing infrastructure are very high, specially if the APIs
do not resemble each other.
“Amazon has in many ways invented and created this market, and with what is projected to be
11http://thoughtsoncloud.com/2012/09/openstack-poised-to-lead-the-way-to-open-cloud-computing/
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$1 billion in ecosystem and customer revenue attached to Amazon cloud, we believe the win-
ning cloud platform will have to have a high degree of interoperability with Amazon” – Sameer
Dholakia, GM Cloud Platforms Group, Citrix, 3 of April 201212
“CloudStack has firmly aligned itself with the Amazon ecosystem. But OpenStack is an interest-
ing case of an organization caught in the middle. Its service provider supporters are fundamen-
tally interested in competing against AWS13 ... they’re afraid of a world in which AWS becomes
the primary way that businesses buy infrastructure. It is to their advantage to have at least one
additional successful widely-adopted cloudmanagement platform in themarket, and at least one
service provider successfully competing strongly against AWS. Yet AWS has established itself as
a de facto standard for cloud APIs and for the way that a service “should” be designed.” – Lydia
Leong, VP Distinguished Analyst, Gartner, 6 of April 201214
developer
& affiliation
collaboration
Figure 7. From the Folsom to the Grizzly release
Figure 7 shows the cooperation in the OpenStack Nova project from the Folsom to the Grizzly release (from
September 27th 2012 to April 4th 2013). As expected, Citrix reduced its commitment to OpenStack, as we
observe reduced cooperative activity from Citrix developers. Canonical continued investing increasingly in
the development of OpenStack, interested in keeping its Linux Distribution Ubuntu as the leading Linux
distribution for OpenStack clouds 15.
VMware, a Northern Californian firm with expertise in virtualization technologies, made substantial contri-
butions (evidenced by the source-code commits) during this between-releases period 16. The acquisition of
the networking virtualization startup Nicira in July of 2012 reshaped the VMware cloud computing strategy.
As a sign of commitment to OpenStack, VMware and Canonical issued a joint statement on their intentions
towork together to improve the integrationVMware technologieswithCanonical’s OpenStack distribution17.
Figure 8 captures the cooperation in the project in a more recent phase, from the Grizzly to the Havana
release (from April 4th 2013 to October 17th 2013). We can see that VMware took its commitment to Open-
Stack seriously, as six new developers engaged in developing with other OpenStack developers. Mirantis, in
yellow on the right of Figure 8, invested heavily in cooperative activities with IBM, Rackspace, and Red Hat.
Mirantis counted on financial support from Dell Ventures and Intel Capital (representing the interests of
12http://www.networkcomputing.com/cloud-infrastructure/amazon-apis-are-fine--for-amazon/
13AWS stands for Amazon Web Services. See http://aws.amazon.com/ for more details.
14http://blogs.gartner.com/lydia_leong/2012/04/06/ecosystems-in-conflict-amazon-vs-vmware-and-openstak/
15http://www.markshuttleworth.com/archives/1373
16http://bitergia.com/openstack-releases-reports
17http://ir.vmware.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=756729
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Figure 8. From the Grizzly to the Havana release
hardware manufacturers betting on OpenStack18 and additional investment by Ericsson, Red Hat, and SAP
Ventures19 , turning it into one of the biggest code contributors to the OpenStack software ecosystem in just
a few months16.
developer
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Figure 9. From the Havana to the Icehouse release
Figure 9 captures the cooperation in the latest period studied, from the Havana to the Icehouse release (from
October 17th 2013 to April 17th 2014).
By this time the role of NASA on OpenStack had diminished. The first developments of OpenStack were in
the service of science, supporting NASA’s research activities. NASA’s participation has been a selling point
for advocates of OpenStack technologies. NASA lost much of its IT staff working on its Nebula cloud com-
puting project. Software developers and IT architects headed to startups and high-tech giants within the
OpenStack ecosystem. Moreover, a cost-driven IT reform led to disinvestment in OpenStack by NASA. To-
day, scientists at NASA depend on the Amazon EC2 andMicrosoft Azure cloud computing infrastructures20.
Meanwhile, on the other side of the Atlantic, the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) de-
cided on an OpenStack based strategy in 2012. In January of 2014, OpenStack was already running collision
18http://www.mirantis.com/company/press-center/company-news/mirantis-receives-10-million
19http://www.mirantis.com/company/press-center/company-news/mirantis-with-investment/
20http://blogs.nasa.gov/NASA-CIO-Blog/2012/06/09/post_1339205656611/
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reconstructions at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC)21.
By pure serendipity, we also explored the cooperation among competing ecosystems (i.e., OpenStack vs.
CloudStack). As pointed out before, Citrix, in a surprise move, and citing the lack of OpenStack interoper-
ability with Amazon cloud systems, acquired Cloud.com in July of 2011 and donated the overall code-base to
the Apache Foundation (a reputed non-profit corporation supporting open-source software). “CloudStack’s
application programming interface (API) provides compatibility with Amazon Web Services’ Elastic Com-
pute Cloud (EC2), theworld’smost popular public cloud” ... “(Citrix) hopes that EC2 customerswill use their
CloudStack for their private cloudswhile using theEC2APIs to integratewithAmazon’s public cloud”22. This
move raised conflict in the OpenStack community. Citrix claimed tomake peace with OpenStack on 21 April
2015 by announcing that it had become a Corporate Sponsor of the OpenStack Foundation23.
From a research point of view, it was unclear during this period of conflict, whether Citrix developers were
contributing to OpenStack, CloudStack or both. By mining both OpenStack and CloudStack repositories
with SNA, we found out that 10 developers contributed both to OpenStack and CloudStack. Six of these
developers were affiliated with Citrix. While Citrix’s contributions were recurrent, the contributions of the
other four were sporadic.
In the following Figure 10, we capture the role of Citrix in cooperation among competing ecosystems, from
the first open-source release of CloudStack to Citrix’s official return to OpenStack (fromNovember 6th 2012
toApril 21th 2015). We represent the ecosystems aswireframe spheres, OpenStack on the left andCloudStack
on the right. Inside each ecosystem, we modeled the cooperative networks of developers that contribute to
both ecosystems. As open-source ecosystems are not black boxes, we were able to identify such developers.
Citrix, as a firm, is represented as a cuboid. The ultra-thin cylinder connecting firms with developers maps
an “affiliation” relationship. Such visualization highlight that Citrix’s developers were contributing to both
OpenStack and CloudStack – in the open-source arena, developers and firms can take part in competing
ecosystems.
Figure 10. Modeling the role of Citrix in cooperation among competing ecosystems
Discussion
This research was conducted with the purpose of exploring cooperation among competitors in the open-
source arena. Our case revealed certain peculiarities that call for the adaptation and expansion of the selected
theory. Among other phenomenological peculiarities we highlight: (1) the inclusiveness of the OpenStack
ecosystem to third-party contributors – this contrasts with literature derived from joint ventures and R&D
21http://home.web.cern.ch/about/updates/2014/01/importance-openstack-cern
22http://www.zdnet.com/article/openstack-vs-cloudstack-the-beginning-of-the-open-source-cloud-wars/
23http://www.citrix.com/news/citrix-in-the-news/apr-2015/citrix-makes-peace-with-openstack
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consortia where access is granted only to a few selected members (cf. Büchel, 2003; Sydow et al., 2012);
(2) the openness and transparency of the OpenStack ecosystem – this contrasts with the literature on inter-
organizational relations that emphasize gate-keeping and intellectual property rights (cf. Granstrand and
Holgersson, 2013; Pagani, 2013); and (3), that actors within our narrative cooperate and compete simul-
taneously at the inter-individual, inter-firm and inter-ecosystem level as demonstrated by Citrix dual-role
in both OpenStack and CloudStack – coopetition among ecosystems remains largely unexplored as pointed
out in a recent review by Bengtsson and Kock (2014).
From the perspective of a network of firms embedded in a socio-technical ecosystem, our research adds to
the paradox literature by responding specifically to Lewis (2000) and to Poole and Van de Ven (1989), who
encouraged researchers to construct concepts and theories dealingwith paradoxical organizational complex-
ities (Chen, 2008). It pioneers by integrating paradigms on competition, cooperation, and open-source soft-
ware. In this regard, we address Lewis and Grime’s (1999) call for research converging disparate paradigms.
Aligned with theory-building strategies proposed by Poole and Van de Ven (1989) to take advantage of para-
doxes of social theory, we adoptedmultiple levels of analysis (such as individual, firm, dyad, and ecosystem)
and theorized on the recent conception of “open-coopetition” proposed by Teixeira and Lin (2014) for a
better understanding of how competing firms cooperate in an open-source way.
This research also contributes to prior research efforts in theoretically integrating the concepts of coopera-
tion and competition (Ahuja, 2000; Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Chen, 2008; Chen and Miller, 2015; Dyer
and Singh, 1998; Gnyawali et al., 2010; Gnyawali and Park, 2011). More particularly, our case confirmed
much of the established literature addressing the competitive-cooperative mode of interorganizational in-
teractions where firms “cooperate with competitors to win” in a self-serving game to ultimately gain the
upper hand (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 2011; Chen and Miller, 2015; Hamel et al., 1989).
As theoretically expected, competing firms cooperatedwithin theOpenStack socio-technical ecosystemseek-
ing complementary external resources (Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Tsai, 2002), to mitigate risk (Gnyawali
and Park, 2011) and to learn from others (Dussauge et al., 2000). Through cooperation, two companies can
gain access to each other’s unique resources or share the cost of developing newunique resources (Bengtsson
and Kock, 2000). Within an open-source scenario, it is an open (i.e., open for contributions from everyone)
and networked community (i.e., relating firms and independent developers) that endows such external re-
sources. Even if the established competition theory did not originate from the open-source context and
rarely takes information systems into account in its conceptualizations, its theoretical lenses proved to be
very useful to make sense of why a network of organizations would joint develop a cloud infrastructure for
big data in an open-source way.
However, our research also contrasts with the established competitive-cooperative literature. First, by the
inclusive and transparent nature of open-source projects – most research addresses alliances that take the
form of joint ventures, consortia, or other arrangements where access is granted only to a few selected part-
ners (Bengtsson and Kock, 2014; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001). As in other open-source projects, in
OpenStack, everyone iswelcome to contribute, and everyone is allowed to copy, sell, and distribute outcomes
from the project. In the OpenStack case, cooperation is wider, more heterogeneous, and more networked
than in much of the competitive-cooperative literature. The cooperation in OpenStack included research
institutes (e.g., CERN and NASA among many others), universities (e.g., Johns Hopkins University, and
Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan among many others), clients (e.g., Korea Telecom, and AT&T among many
others deploying OpenStack), hardware suppliers (e.g., Intel and Cisco), competitors (e.g., IBM and HP),
and many independent third-party developers which are often hobbyists without clear affiliation. Future
research is needed to assess how the nature of open-source software influences coopetitive relationships.
We conducted the analysis of relational interactions at the inter-individual, inter-firm and inter-ecosystem
level. As research addressing coopetition among ecosystems remains scarce (Bengtsson and Kock, 2014),
we centered our discussion on results that explore OpenStack in relation to its competing ecosystems (i.e.,
CloudStack and Amazon). We highlight the role of Citrix, a key actor in the ecosystemwhich commitment to
OpenStack evolved over time. As reported earlier, by 2010, Citrix was the partner of Rackspace on the early
days ofOpenStack atNASA (see Figure 2). On the follow-up of Citrix’s acquisition of Cloud.comon July 2011,
Citrix announced to ’abandon’ OpenStack in September 2012 citing the lack of integrationwith the Amazon’s
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APIs. Citrix opted to focus instead on CloudStack which codebase was open-sourced with its acquisition of
Cloud.com (see Figures 5 to 8 for the progressively decreasing presence of developers affiliated with Citrix).
Citrix claimed later tomake peacewithOpenStack on 21 April 2015 by official becoming a Corporate Sponsor
of the OpenStack. By mining both OpenStack and CloudStack repositories, we found out that six developers
affiliatedwith Citrix were actually recurrently contributing to both competing ecosystems during the conflict
period (see Figure 10 ).
From the perspective of a dyad of socio-technical ecosystems, we add to literature on portfolio of alliances
(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Duysters et al., 2012; Hoffmann, 2007; Lavie, 2007; Lavie and Miller, 2008;
Lavie and Singh, 2012; Wassmer, 2010). As highlighted in Figure 10, we remarked that developers affiliated
with Citrix contributed concurrently to two competing open-source ecosystems (i.e., OpenStack and Cloud-
Stack). In fact, Citrix recurrently engaged in cooperation with many other IT giants (e.g., with Amazon in
setting cloud computing interoperability standards24 , with Microsoft in ’PC’ virtualization technologies25
and with Google by joint-developing software powering the ’Chromebook laptop family’26 among others).
Such netting cooperative behavior of Citrix was not exceptional, HP also contributed to both OpenStack and
Eucalyptus (another open-source cloud computing ecosystem). The observed mesh of alliances adds rele-
vance to research on how tomanage a portfolio of alliances (Hoffmann, 2005; Hoffmann, 2007). Anand and
Khanna (2000) argued that firms should build an alliance management capability while Hoffmann (2005)
reported on the institutionalisation of multi-alliance management.
Research on multi-alliance management addressed the effects of alliance portfolio diversity. However, re-
sults on a diversity-performance relationship are rather inconclusive with mixed results (Duysters et al.,
2012). It is generally accepted that redundant alliances can increase the reliability of the information and
resources that a focal company has access to and also reduce the dependence on a single partner (Hoffmann,
2005). However, the advantage of a portfolio of alliances is not so much a matter of the portfolio’s size (i.e.
number of alliances), but a matter of characteristics of the firms that a focal organization is connected to
(Stuart, 2000). Also, that the performance of a focal firm improves with the intensity of competition among
partners in its alliance portfolio (Lavie, 2007). The evolution of alliance portfolios is contingent on ex-
ternal constraints and opportunities (changes in exogenous uncertainty), internal resources available, and
strategic choices that interact and drive the pace, pattern, and direction of the evolution of a firm’s alliance
portfolio (Hoffmann, 2007). Inertial pressures tend to fixate the current configuration of the alliance port-
folio, whereas external stimuli in the form of technological changes and shifts in strategy set new courses for
alliances (Lavie and Singh, 2012).
As information systems become increasingly networked and interconnected (Ciborra et al., 2000; Henfrids-
son and Bygstad, 2013) and research in multi-alliance management remains scarce and inconclusive (Duys-
ters et al., 2012; Lavie and Singh, 2012), there is an opportunity for information systems research to bridge
the literature in multi-alliance management and the literature in open-source software. Given the trans-
disciplinary nature of information systems (Carillo and Bernard, 2015; Galliers, 2003) the IS field would
be a perfect candidate for engaging in a trans-disciplinary dialog and play a central role in producing a cu-
mulative body of high-quality research grasping both multi-alliance management (Rai and Tang, 2010) and
open-source software (von Krogh and Spaeth, 2007). As become salient in our case by the pivotal role of
Citrix across ecosystems, and as evidenced by the sampled cases of open-coopetition (see Table 1), firms
are often involved in multiple and often competing open-source ecosystems. However, it remains largely
unknown how organizations manage their involvement across multiple and often competing open-source
ecosystems – a promising avenue for future research.
A wide range of research focused on competition between ecosystems Apple Safari vs. Microsoft Internet
Explorer, Nokia N-Gage vs. Nintendo Gameboy, Microsoft Music Player vs. Apple iTunes, Google Android
vs. Apple iPhone and Google Talk vs. Skype as captured in a recent study by Eisenmann et al. (2011).
Researchers tend to stress on ecosystems as competing entities while ignoring cooperation among them. By
exploring both competition and cooperation among ecosystems, we propose that development transparency
and the weak intellectual property rights, two well-known characteristics of open-source ecosystems, allow
24http://www.citrix.com/global-partners/amazon-web-services/overview.html
25http://www.citrix.com/global-partners/microsoft/overview.html
26http://www.citrix.com/news/announcements/aug-2014/citrix-collaboration-with-google
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an easier transfer of information and resources from one alliance to another (see Hoffmann, 2005). The
scholars Parise and Casher (2003) pointed out that ”sharing of information and knowledge across these
alliances is rare“, but Hoffmann (2005) pointed out synergies from transferring information and resources
from one alliance to another. Future research is needed to access the impacts of development transparency
and weak intellectual property rights on spillovers, after all, open-source initiatives are ”free spillovers“
(West and Gallagher, 2006) or ”spillovers without compensation“ (Gassmann et al., 2010).
By exploring theOpenStack ecosystem, following especially the evolution of Citrix’s competitive-cooperative
actions, we propose the following theoretical proposition pinpointing a peculiarity of cooperating with com-
petitors in an open-source way:
Theoretical Proposition 1 –Within anR&D contextwhere a focal firm is engaged inmultiple alliances,
development transparency and weak intellectual property rights, allow an easier transfer of information
and resources between alliances.
At first sight, and while providing insight into why firms cooperate with competitors in an open-source way,
the advanced proposition makes a virtue of open-coopetition (i.e., because it enables a focal firm to transfer
information and resources more easily between multiple alliances). However, living with paradox implies
that we shift expectations for rationality and linearity to accept paradoxes as persistent and unsolvable puz-
zles (Smith and Lewis, 2011). Consequently, we caution against seeing the ”ease of transfer“ as a pure virtue.
If in one hand, the focal firm can benefit from an easier transfer of information and resources between al-
liances, on the other hand, (2) its competitors can also benefit from transparency andweak intellectual rights
(either entering in the same alliances or not). Evenwithin the context ofmultiple alliances, open-coopetition
remains paradoxical and difficult to explain. From one side, organizations can simultaneously benefit from
both coopetition (see Bengtsson and Kock, 2000; Chen and Miller, 2015; Gulati et al., 2012) and open-
source innovation (see Ågerfalk and Fitzgerald, 2008; Fitzgerald, 2006; von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003).
But from the other side, there is an increased risk of opportunistic behavior and unintended spillover effects
(see Nooteboom et al., 1997; Park and Russo, 1996; Trott and Hartmann, 2009).
Given the specific empirical background, where OpenStack challenges the dominance of the cloud comput-
ing market by three large players (i.e., Amazon, Google, and Microsoft), we add OpenStack as yet another
paradoxical case of firms’ investment in open-source software to disrupt the leading positions of proprietary
software players (see West, 2003; West and Gallagher, 2006). However, as pointed out in a recent review
by Teixeira and Baiyere (2014), ”tables turned“, open-source ecosystems should no longer be seen as the
alternative to proprietary ecosystems controlled by leading, and often monopolistic, players (e.g., Linux vs.
Windows, Mozilla vs. Internet Explorer, and R vs. SPSS among others). As outlined in Table 1, several
open-source ecosystems are now leading the market. For example, Google Android and the Open Hand-
set Alliance are leading the mobile platforms market while traditional proprietary software players, such as
Microsoft and Blackberry, are currently struggling with residual sales (Teixeira and Baiyere, 2014).
We remain far from a comprehensive understanding of ”why, how, andwhen competitors cooperate in open-
source ecosystems“. However, our research efforts suggest that coopetition in an open-source way have
its peculiarities - future research is needed to assess the impact of the open-source movement to theory
addressing both cooperation and competition in inter-organizational settings.
Conclusion
Managers deal with tensions in which opposing forces push or pull the organization in several ways at the
same time (Lewis, 2000; Nutt and Backoff, 1993). In industries characterized by high R&D costs and un-
certainty (e.g., information technology sector), managers might have to deal with the competition versus
cooperation and open-source versus proprietary technology development paradoxes simultaneously. Both
by visualizing the evolution of the social structure of OpenStack and by scrutinizing complementary quali-
tative data, we propose that the development transparency and weak intellectual property rights (i.e., char-
acteristics of open-source ecosystems) allow a focal firm to transfer information and resources more easily
between its multiple alliances.
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